This paper studies the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European countries (CESEE) in comparison with other OECD countries. CESEE countries tend to grow faster and have more volatile output than non-CESEE OECD countries, which has implications for macroeconomic management: better fiscal and monetary institutions are needed to avoid pro-cyclical policies. The paper develops a Budgetary Discipline Index to assess whether good fiscal institutions underpin good fiscal outcomes. Even though most CESEE countries have low scores, the debt/GDP ratios declined before the crisis. This was largely the consequence of a very favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the interest rate, but such a favourable relationship is not expected in the future. Ökonometriai számításaink igazolják, hogy a jobb költségvetési intézményrendszerrel rendelkező országokban az államadósság/GDP mutató jobban csökkent és a költségvetés egyensúlya is kedvezőbb volt. Emellett számításaink arra is rámutatnak, hogy a jobb monetáris intézményrendszerek csökkentik a makrogazdasági változékonyságot.
INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to identify the major institutional determinants of macroeconomic stability and aggregate budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European (CESEE) countries. 1 The region grew fast before the crisis, but the crisis hit most of these countries hard -more so than any other country group of the world -and the recovery from the crisis is also generally slow. As a consequence, the pre-crisis seemingly smooth economic progress and good budgetary record suddenly came to an end.
Have fiscal 2 and monetary institutions played important roles in macroeconomic stability and aggregate budgetary control? Since the crisis had a decisive impact on both macroeconomic stability and budgetary control, the impact of these institutions on the buildup of pre-crisis vulnerabilities and on crisis response has a crucial relevance to this question. This paper defines fiscal institutions as a set of arrangements directing budgetary preparation (including expenditure frameworks and fiscal rules), approval and execution.
Monetary institutions are associated with the exchange rate regime, the quality of financial regulation and supervision, the independence of central banks, and the transparency of central bank decision making. Causal links from fiscal and monetary institutions to budgetary control and macroeconomic stability can be hypothesised as follows:
 Fiscal institutions and macroeconomic stability: Countries with better fiscal frameworks are presumably following counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Letting automatic stabilisers run and implementing counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy through the business cycle can dampen macroeconomic volatility.
 Fiscal institutions and budgetary control: Better fiscal institutions can directly lead to better budgetary outcomes (i.e. low deficit or surplus, and low public debt) by constraining fiscal policy. 1 This paper analyses 26 countries of central, eastern and south-eastern Europe: 12 central European and Baltic members of the EU (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), the six European CIS countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine), five non-EU countries of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), and Albania, Georgia and Turkey. The information in this paper with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey will preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue". 2 For the purposes of this paper, "budgetary" and "fiscal" have the same meaning.
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 Monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability: The ultimate goal of monetary policy should be the stabilisation of the economy through the business cycle, and better monetary institutions should be more successful in achieving this goal.
Monetary institutions are defined broadly, and the role of financial stability is considered through regulation and supervision. The crisis has proven even more clearly that financial stability has strong implications for macroeconomic stability.
 Monetary institutions and budgetary control: There should not be a direct causal link from monetary institutions to budgetary control. However, the indirect channel through a higher level of macroeconomic stability can work.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes macroeconomic stability and budgetary outcomes. Budgetary institutions are assessed in Section 3: the "Budgetary Discipline Index" deviates from similar indices in the literature as it considers a set of institutional features that focus specifically on budgetary discipline. Section 4 discusses monetary institutions. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis on the impact of fiscal and monetary institutions on macroeconomic stability and budgetary control. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FISCAL OUTCOMES

DEVELOPMENT OF GDP
Most of the CESEE countries (except Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) went through a historically unprecedented transition from socialist political systems towards democracies and from centrally planned economies towards market economies. The extraordinarily deep recession after the collapse of the communist regimes was followed by a fast and apparently smooth economic recovery -that is, growth of per capita GDP has well exceeded the growth in the CESEE region's main trading partners (Figure 1 ). Sources: Eurostat (EU countries and Croatia), OECD (other OECD countries and Russian Federation), and national statistical offices, IMF and EBRD quarterly GDP database (other countries). Whenever seasonally adjusted series were not available, the Census X-12 method for seasonal adjustment was used. Selowsky and Zalduendo, 2009; Darvas, 2010; and Becker et al., 2010) , so only the main 3 similar to the role the EU played for CESEE countries. Economic growth in the CESEE region relied on net private capital inflows, which have reached higher levels than elsewhere. In the account deficits. Economic recovery was accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations -3
There are also differences within the CESEE region, however. The new EU member states have reached the highest level of integration, followed by the countries of the western Balkans and Turkey that have the status of either EU candidate or potential candidate. The six Eastern Partnership countries, which were part of the Soviet Union, have reached varying degrees of integration with the EU15, and the Russian Federation still remains an important anchor for these countries.
But the CESEE development model had two important variants within the region. Some countries, most notably countries in central Europe, were more successful in making use of the development model. In these countries, pre-crisis growth was accompanied by small and even improving trade balances, as a reflection of reindustrialisation after the collapse that foll d not be hit too har s the crisis unfolded, the crunch was replaced by falling demand for credit, caused by increased uncertainty and lowered expectations with respect to future growth prospects (Ghosh, 2009 The first one can be regarded as an average measure of stability, while the second can be regarded as a "tail" event. The selection of these measures is based on the following:
The developments described in the previous sub-section suggest that considering the pre- be misleading, since pre-crisis economic growth has led to economic structures that made CESEE countries more prone to the crisis. In particular, the seemingly fast and smooth growth before the crisis has led to vulnerabilities in several CESEE countries, which eventually resulted in huge output falls and slow recoveries so far.
Therefore, the crisis should be included in the sample. On the other hand, the 1990s was burdened with so many structural changes that the inclusion of this sample period would not be informative. Therefore, whenever data availability allows, the sample period of 2000-10 is used when studying macroeconomic stability, but a pre-crisis sample period (2000-07) is also used for comparison.
Macroeconomic stability has various interpretations. The focus here is on GDP volatility, which of course can also reflect internal and external disequilibrium. Ideally, GDP volatility should be measured as the volati 5
At the broadest level, macroeconomic stability can be defined as the volatility of output. It could also be defined, for example, as the level and volatility of inflation (representing internal equilibrium in the economy) or the level and volatility of the current account balance (representing external equilibrium). However, the assessment of both internal and external equilibrium is complicated by the economic developments of CESEE countries. whereas it has been stable (or showed just slight decreases) in (other) OECD countries. One reason for this development could be differences in budget balances. However, this is certainly not the case, since the budget balance 6 was better in non-CESEE OECD countries than in CESEE countries. Therefore, the two measures described at the beginning of this subsection are not perfectly correlated.
The explanation for the divergent trends in debt/GDP ratios is most likely the consequence of a highly favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the interest rate. As Figure 6 indicates, economic growth in CESEE countries largely exceeded the interest rate before the crisis, while in (other) OECD countries the two variables broadly moved together. The favourable relationship in CESEE countries was supported by financial integration (by reducing borrowing costs), higher real GDP growth rates and higher inflation rates. 7 6 The primary balance is unfortunately not available for several CESEE countries.
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It should be noted that, during the crisis, the interest rate risk premium has increased and may remain at about pre-crisis levels in the coming years, while nominal GDP growth may be squeezed. Therefore, such a highly favourable relationship between the growth rate and the interest rate may not return. Also, this paper uses the actual implicit interest rate, which is largely determined by past interest rates due to long maturity bonds. A rise in spot interest rates will be shown in the implicit interest rates after a lag. Note: Interest rate=government interest expenditures/previous year gross debt.
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and Eurostat website (implicit interest rate).
FISCAL INSTITUTIONS
This section identifies budgetary institutions which may contribute to aggregate control and fiscal discipline, and proposes a new index called "Budgetary Discipline Index". The "Fiscal
Institutions Index" of Fabrizio and Mody (2008) and the budgetary institutions indexes of Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2007) have motivated the development of this
Budgetary Discipline Index which nevertheless differs by according more importance to different or additional aspects and by omitting some criteria analysed by the previous authors. This paper develops a set of institutional features which are considered to be crucial for mechanisms of fiscal discipline at the three stages of the budgetary cycle: the preparation stage (when the budget is drafted), the authorisation stage (when the budget is approved by parliament) and the implementation stage (when the budget is implemented and may be amended). The set provides a benchmark for assessing the countries and a basis for constructing the Budgetary Discipline Index.
BUDGET PREPARATION STAGE
For the stage of budgetary preparation, three leading parameters contribute to budgetary control: fiscal rules, the medium-term expenditure framework and multi-annual expenditure estimates.
Fiscal rules
According to the definition of a fiscal rule proposed by Kopits and Symanski (1998, p. 2), a fiscal rule is "a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance. …A critical feature of a fiscal rule is that …it is intended for application on a permanent basis by successive governments in a given country." ceilings (ceilings that cannot be changed from year to year). Expenditure rules are always anchored in a budget balance rule over the cycle (see below). Expenditure rules can provide an operational tool to trigger the required fiscal consolidation consistent with sustainability. Steering on the expenditure side rather than on a cyclically adjusted deficit constraint is more transparent and possibly less susceptible to manipulation (Anderson and Minarik, 2006) . Therefore, the largest value is assigned to expenditure rules.
 Budget balance rules, which can be set as headline balance and structural (or cyclically adjusted) balance, help to ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio converges to a finite level. (Sometimes the "balance rule" is referred to as a "deficit rule".) would be difficult to produce an accurate cyclical component. Therefore, this paper does not separate structural and headline balance rules, but rather assigns them the same score (after expenditure rules).
 Debt rules set an explicit limit or target for public debt in per cent of GDP. This type of rule is, by definition, the most effective in terms of ensuring convergence to a debt target. However, it does not provide sufficient guidance for fiscal policy when debt is well below its ceiling. Therefore, debt rules score low in the calculation.
A significant proportion of countries frequently combine balance and debt rules, which reflects governments' preferences for rules with a close link to fiscal sustainability.
Finally, the absence of a fiscal rule of any kind does not contribute to fiscal discipline; thus a zero is assigned to the countries with no fiscal rules.
Medium-term expenditure framework
Almost all OECD countries currently work with a medium-term expenditure framework.
Most of them adjust the framework from year to year in the light of the previous year's outcomes, new estimates of the consequences of current policies and new political priorities.
This framework can be called a flexible one. The major advantage of a flexible framework in comparison to no framework is that, at the time of budget formulation, the multi-annual consequences of all changes (setbacks and windfalls on the revenue and expenditure sides, and new priorities) have to be traded off against each other and against the adjustment of medium-term targets for expenditures, revenues or the deficit.
A few countries (notably the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have a medium-term expenditure framework that is not adjusted from year to year; this can be called a fixed framework. It is characteristic for a fixed framework that, during budget 9
See Figure 3 for an example of the uncertainty of output gap estimates.
formulation, all line-item budget numbers and all line-item multi-year estimates have to be squeezed under the overall ceiling over the entire term of the framework. The first major advantage of a fixed expenditure framework in comparison to no framework is identical to that of a flexible framework: all trade-offs have to be considered. A second major advantage is that a fixed framework is (more) effective than a flexible framework in realising multi-year expenditure targets. Precisely because the overall ceiling cannot be changed from year to year, the target is automatically realised as long as the framework is maintained. Although only a few OECD countries work with a fixed expenditure framework, many others seek to keep their expenditure framework as stable as possible from year to year (without formally committing to a fixed framework).
Medium-term expenditure frameworks sometimes contain not only overall ceilings or broad sectoral ceilings for central government, local government or the social security funds, but also ceilings at the level of ministries or expenditure areas. Ministerial ceilings are important because, once established, they impose a certain discipline on ministers and help to prevent overspending.
CESEE countries have also adopted expenditure frameworks in their budgetary process.
The frameworks are characterised by different degrees of flexibility. For the purposes of this paper, the highest score was attributed to the countries that have fixed ceilings for the ministries at the very beginning of the budget formulation process and that try to keep them as stable as possible from year to year. If a country has targets which may be substantially changed and renegotiated during the budget drafting process, the country was given a score of zero.
Multi-annual estimates
Multi-annual estimates should be integrated into the annual budget to ensure consistency with the expenditure framework. Multi-annual line-item estimates on the basis of current policy or current law are essential for the allocation of financial resources in the annual budget negotiation, and they help to ensure the consistency of current law or policy with the multi-annual ceilings. Multi-annual estimates on the basis of current policy or current law ("baseline estimates") should be produced and agreed between the line ministry and the finance ministry at least twice a year. Such estimates are an essential tool for budgetary discipline not only during budget formulation, but also during budget execution: during execution, they alert at an early stage to possible overspending, which may trigger corrective measures.
Establishing the expenditure framework can be seen as a top-down process, and preparing budgetary and multi-annual estimates as a bottom-up process. In fact, the reconciliation of prescriptive targets or ceilings with descriptive line-item estimates is central to a programme-based budget process. Government spending programmes in OECD countries have reached such levels of size and complexity that it is frequently difficult to make policy changes in the current year that substantially affect the next year's budget.
Therefore, the maximum score was attributed to the countries where multi-annual lineitem estimates based on current policy are updated twice or several times per year, a lower score to the countries where multi-annual line-item estimates based on current policy are available at the start of the budget preparation, and zero to the countries where the estimates are prepared on an ad hoc basis or are not produced at all.
BUDGET AUTHORISATION STAGE (LEGISLATION)
In the legislative stage of the budgetary process, parliament can amend the budget bill and either pass or reject it. Two indicators in this second stage are important for promoting fiscal discipline: constraints on parliament to amend the budget bill, and independent assessment of fiscal policy by a fiscal council.
Constraints on parliament to amend the budget bill
The approval stage of the budget cycle serves as an important opportunity for debate of the executive's policy and expenditure priorities. Without intending to study the meaning of political representation or the confidence in the legislature held by civil society, the argument is that a restricted formal amendment power of parliament contributes to better budgetary discipline. If the legislature can only make budget amendments under the condition that the budget balance (surplus or deficit) within the executive's budget proposal is unchanged -or, alternatively, if the legislature can only amend downwards any aggregates of expenditurethe constraints on the executive budget are maintained and the budgetary cycle is not fragmented. This situation will contribute to fiscal discipline. The highest score was attributed to countries where the amendment power of parliament is restricted, and a score of zero to the countries where the legislature may increase or decrease the level of revenues and/or expenditures without the consent of the executive.
Fiscal councils
An independent fiscal agency or a fiscal council can help in the formulation and implementation of sound fiscal policies. Fiscal councils analyse and assess budgetary developments and policies, offer advice, and stimulate public debate and scrutiny while leaving the policy mandate with the elected representatives. Fiscal councils can provide independent input into the budgetary process and contribute to greater transparency by alerting about the political cost of inappropriate policy.
The desirable form of a fiscal council is specific to each country. The best form depends on the nature of a country's political environment, including the constitutional set-up, the legal traditions and the policy-making customs. A fiscal council can complement the role played by existing institutions and enhance the effectiveness of fiscal rules (see Debrun, Hauner and Kumar, 2009 ).
For the analysis in this paper, only fiscal agencies which are fully independent (or a nonpartisan government agency) and whose role consists in assessing fiscal policy were considered. The premise is that the larger the guarantee of independence from political interference, the greater the likelihood of perceived or actual impact on fiscal outcomes.
BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
In the third stage, the budget law is executed and further modifications of the law may be possible. Two parameters were selected to indicate the level of budgetary control: the rules for carryovers of unused funds to the next fiscal year, and the quality of external audit.
Carryovers of unused funds
The issue of carryovers of unused funds to the next fiscal year arises in the stage of budgetary execution. Any automatic carryover arrangement, whether cash-based or accruals-based, will lead to stacks of unused appropriations that will increase from year to year. Any general rule limiting carryover will lead to "December fever". Therefore, the most sensible solution is bilateral negotiation between the line minister and the finance minister on a case-by-case basis. Under a cash regime, each agreed carryover will have to be compensated in the next budget year and the finance minister should see to that (Kraan, 2007) . Therefore, the rules allowing carryovers within certain limits with authorisation of the finance ministry were given the highest score, prohibited carryovers were given an average score, and unlimited carryover rules (which do not contribute to fiscal discipline) were given a value of zero.
Quality of external audit
The quality of external audit is probably the most arbitrary parameter. It encompasses various issues related to external audit, namely the openness and availability of audit reports to the public, timeliness of such publications, the nature of audit reports (for instance, performance audit reports are considered as a more advanced level of auditing with greater outcomes than compliance reports), the mechanism provided for follow-up measures, and some other criteria which can differ depending on countries' circumstances. Therefore, the countries with both financial and performance audits complemented by strong mechanisms for follow-up measures score high in the ranking. A focus on financial audit and/or insufficient use of audit reports indicates an insufficient level of development of audit institutions (zero score). Table 1 provides an overview of the design of the Budgetary Discipline Index and indicates the preferred weights.
DESIGN OF THE INDEX
It should be kept in mind that the study looks at budgetary institutions from the perspective of how well they contribute to the fulfilment of one particular function of the budget: control of spending, taxation and borrowing. Therefore, other functions of the budget -namely the efficient allocation of resources, the cost-efficient management of spending programmes, the democratic authorisation of and accountability for taxation, spending and borrowing -are not considered. This focus determines the set of variables in the construction of the Budgetary Discipline Index. Institutional characteristics that promote co-ordinated and cohesive decision making are expected to be more conducive to fiscal discipline and therefore receive a higher score in the quantitative index used for the empirical analysis. The objective of the budget reviews is to provide a comprehensive overview of the budget process in the country under examination, to evaluate national experiences in the light of international best practice and to provide specific policy recommendations, as well as to offer other countries an opportunity to comment on specific budgeting issues in the country under examination ("peer review"). 10 The reviews look at the budget institutions or the rules of the budget process and the way they function. Therefore, the budget reviews provided the required facts and analyses of institutional features in CESEE countries.
The By comparing the indices of CESEE countries (Figure 7 ) with the indices of OECD countries (Figure 8 ), the OECD indices appear to be generally higher, and the average index among OECD countries (2.7) is significantly higher than the average index in CESEE countries (2.2). However, there is a relatively large heterogeneity among OECD countries as well, and some OECD countries -namely the United States, Australia, Norway, Belgium and Switzerland -show relatively low rates.
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Budgetary Discipline Index for CESEE countries
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
The nature of the exchange rate regime is the dominant determinant of monetary institutions. Table 4 indicates a wide diversity of exchange rate regimes, both across countries and over time. It is interesting to observe that sometimes even countries with similar circumstances often opted for different regimes: for example, the Czech Republic Have exchange rate regimes played a role in macroeconomic developments? Table 5 presents rough evidence that they may have. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes had higher macroeconomic volatility, larger current account deficits, higher inflation, faster credit growth, and a higher share of finance and real estate sectors in FDI inflows.
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For catching-up economies, the adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes carries a risk (see, for example, Darvas and Szapáry, 2008) . When the exchange rate is fixed, price level convergence -which accompanies economic catching-up -translates into higher inflation.
(In floating exchange rate countries, nominal exchange rate appreciation can also accommodate price level convergence.) But when the exchange rate peg is credible, nominal interest rates decline, and borrowers are also more willing to take foreign currency loans because they do not observe the exchange rate risk. But higher inflation and low interest rates (either domestic currency interest rates, or foreign currency interest rates) fuel credit booms which can lead to real estate booms and overheating of the economy, which in turn raise inflation above its equilibrium value, leading to a vicious circle. All these factors can lead to a misallocation of capital and labour. Source: Authors' calculations using data from the IMF (first four indicators) and wiiw (sectoral composition of FDI).
However, it also has to be emphasised that a floating exchange rate regime is not a panacea. For example, Hungary (a floating exchange rate country) was the first to turn to the IMF for help after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Romania and Serbia, two other floating rate countries, also had to rely on an IMF financing programme. Therefore, while the evidence in Table 5 is telling, other factors should be at work in addition to the exchange rate regime.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Central bank independence is an important metric of monetary institutions. In a seminal work, Kydland and Prescott (1977) developed a model of the so-called time inconsistency problem. Central bankers not isolated from political pressures would have ended up running inflationary policies without being able to boost the economy, which probably characterised a couple of central banks in the 1970s when inflation was high and growth was low in advanced countries. Solutions to the problem of time inconsistency were 30 offered by Rogoff (1985) and Walsh (1995) : either hiring a central banker who is strongly opposed to inflation or giving the central banker incentives to keep inflation as low as possible. Since then, a consensus has developed that the central bank's management has to be isolated from the government.
The literature has developed ways to measure central bank independence. This paper uses the index developed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) which has been updated by Crowe and Meade (2007) . Unfortunately, the most recent year for which this index is available is 2003. Figures 9 and 10 monetary policy over the last twenty years has been improvements in transparency Eichengreen, 2007, 2009; Geraats, 2006 Geraats, , 2008 Geraats, , 2009 This study uses the index developed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) . Figure 11 shows the transparency index for 2000 and 2006. Improvements can be observed in some CESEE countries, but several of these countries still have a large gap compared to OECD countries ( Figure 12 ). Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to measure the "quality" of financial regulation because it has so many dimensions (see, for example, Hilbers et al., 2005) . Also, in an integrated market, domestic financial regulation may not be very effective after all. On average, 70% of the domestic banking systems in CESEE countries are owned by mostly western European banking groups (Berglöf et al., 2009) and, under free capital mobility, domestic regulations could be circumvented.
A set of indicators to measure regulation and supervision has been developed by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) . Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) However, the assessment of financial regulation and supervision is complicated by the fact that the lack of strict financial regulation has led to unsustainable credit booms in certain countries, but not in others. These differing outcomes could most likely be explained by the appropriateness of other elements of the macroeconomic policy mix. To put it another way, one cannot claim that the lack of strict regulation and supervision was a policy mistake. One can only claim that it was a likely policy mistake in countries in which credit growth reached extraordinarily high levels. Not surprisingly, the pre-crisis speed of credit growth correlates strongly with pre-crisis current account imbalances and also with output falls in 2009 in CESEE countries, as Figure 17 indicates. The correlation in non-CESEE OECD countries is weaker, but this is not surprising since there were just a few non-CESEE OECD countries that followed a growth model similar to that of CESEE countries, like the Mediterranean euro area members. The correlation of pre-crisis credit growth and GDP volatility reveals a similar relationship (Figure 18 ). 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Having established certain measures of fiscal and monetary institutions in the previous sections, this section presents formal econometric models for studying the impact of these institutions on macroeconomic stability and budgetary control. (1)
where denotes the logarithm of GDP volatility (a logarithmic transformation is adopted in order to ensure that the fitted volatility will be positive), ) log( framework in settling disputes, efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations, transparency of government policy making, business costs of terrorism, business costs of crime and violence, organised crime, reliability of police services, ethical behaviour of firms, strength of auditing and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards, and protection of minority shareholders' interests.
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The only exception is central bank transparency when controls are not included. on government debt and balance developments. As argued in Section 2.3, the study regresses the change in the debt/GDP ratio and not the level of that ratio, because current fiscal institutions do not have an impact on the inherited stock of debt which largely determines the actual level of debt. 16 Of course, the study controls for the initial level of debt (by including the debt level of 2000) because countries with higher debt/GDP ratios may make more efforts to reduce their debt. The study also controls for the interest rate/GDP growth rate differential because, as argued in Section 2.3, this differential had a significant impact on debt developments. These controls are included in every regression.
Other control variables are also added one by one: overall institutional quality, the four measures of monetary institutions, and GDP volatility. Therefore, the regression has the following form:
The following parameter signs would be in line with our priors: Table 7 . 16 The historical developments of fiscal institutions likely have an impact on historical debt developments. If fiscal institutions are persistent, then past fiscal institutions can impact both current fiscal institutions and current debt levels. However, even in this case current fiscal institutions likely impact the change in debt; therefore, the regression is correct in this case. Furthermore, fiscal institutions change in time, which further calls for the analysis of the change in debt and not in the level of debt. Notes: BDI: Budgetary Discipline Index. Constant is also included in the regression; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; the t-ratios are shown below the parameter estimates. Parameter estimates that are statistically significant (at least at the 10% level) are in bold.
Source: Authors' calculations.
The Budgetary Discipline Index is not significant for the combined sample of OECD and CESEE countries, but this result is due to the inclusion of OECD countries. When the sample is restricted to CESEE countries only, the point estimate is negative as expected, and the results are highly significant when considering the 2000-10 sample. It has already been argued that the 2000-10 sample is preferable to the 2000-07 sample.
The interest rate/growth rate differential is highly significant with a proper positive coefficient in all regressions, and the initial level of debt is highly significant with a proper negative sign for the CESEE countries.
A couple of additional control variables have been included. First, we controlled for the overall institutional quality, because we have found that countries with better overall institutions tend to have better budgetary institutions as well. However, as Table 7 reveals, the BDI variable continues to be significant when controlling for the overall institutional quality, while this latter variable is not significant (and even contradictory has a positive point estimate). Second, we controlled for all four measures of monetary institutions (we have added them to the equation one by one) to see whether they have an impact on debt developments: none of the four indicators had a significant parameter estimate. Third, we also controlled for macroeconomic stability, but again, this variable turned out to be insignificant. The BDI variable retained its significantly negative estimate (for the CESEE sample) when using any of these additional control variables. Therefore, a higher BDI implies a fall in debt, and this result is robust to various controls.
The poor results of the index for the OECD countries can be explained by the existence of some outliers like Japan (highest BDI and debt) or Norway (low BDI and low debt) with country-specific circumstances. Moreover, the parameters selected for designing the index are rather tailored to the CESEE area and do not reflect a number of nuances characteristic for advanced countries. Therefore, it can impair the index results for the OECD area.
Regarding the estimates for the average budget balance, the explanatory variables are identical to the debt regressions: The expected result is exactly the opposite parameter signs to the debt regressionsthat is, Table 8 . Table 8 . Notes: BDI: Budgetary Discipline Index. Constant is also included in the regression; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; the t-ratios are shown below the parameter estimates. Parameter estimates that are statistically significant (at least at the 10% level) are in bold.
Regression of average balance/GDP on Budgetary Discipline Index
In general, the results are similar to the results obtained for the debt regression, though there are important differences. The Budgetary Discipline Index is not significant for the combined sample of OECD and CESEE countries, but is significant, with a proper sign, for the CESEE sample. The results are now significant for both time periods. The interest rate/growth rate differential is significant with a proper parameter sign, but the initial debt level is not significant. 17
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and budgetary control. To this end, a new index of budgetary discipline was created (using available data from 2007/08) which combines rules and procedures for the three main stages of budgeting: the preparation stage (when the budget is drafted), the authorisation stage (when the budget is approved by parliament) and the implementation stage (when the budget is implemented and may be amended). For monetary institutions, four indicators were studied: the type of exchange rate regime, an index of central bank independence, an index of central bank transparency, and an index of financial regulation and supervision. Since the latter suffers from deficiencies, the pre-crisis speed of credit growth has been used as a proxy for proper financial regulation and supervision.
This paper studied the impact of these indicators on macroeconomic stability and budgetary control. It has been noted that CESEE countries tend to grow faster (or at least tended to grow faster before the crisis) and have more volatile growth than non-CESEE OECD countries. This phenomenon has implications for macroeconomic management.
More volatile output developments lead to more volatile budget revenues, and expenditures (both through automatic stabilisers and possibly through discretionary stimulus) are also expected to be more volatile. In the absence of sound fiscal institutions, this could lead to pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Indeed, using structural vector-autoregressions, Darvas (2010) found that fiscal policy was pro-cyclical in most CESEE countries (with a few exceptions). This calls for strong fiscal institutions. Yet the Budgetary Discipline Index suggests that fiscal institutions are considerably weaker in several CESEE countries than in non-CESEE OECD countries. Therefore, there is significant room for improvement in most countries.
The recent global financial and economic crisis hit CESEE countries harder than other emerging country regions of the world. Recovery from the crisis is also slower. These developments raise question marks about the pre-crisis development model of the region, which was largely based on institutional, financial and trade integration with the EU and was accompanied by substantial labour mobility. Recent research suggests that the good features of this model should be preserved, but several CESEE countries have to implement significant changes to this economic model in a much less benign domestic and international environment. Economic growth will likely fall substantially behind pre-crisis economic growth trends.
It has been shown that the general decline in government debt/GDP ratios of most CESEE countries before the crisis was the consequence of a highly favourable relationship between economic growth and the interest rate: economic growth well exceeded the interest rate. Therefore, government debt/GDP ratios fell in CESEE countries but not in non-CESEE OECD countries, even though the budget balance was better in the non-CESEE OECD group. Since growth will likely slow down and interest rates will rise after the crisis, a less favourable relationship is expected between the growth rate and the interest rate which also calls for enhanced budgetary frameworks.
By comparing the budgetary discipline indices of CESEE countries with the indices of OECD countries, the latter appear to be generally higher, and the average index among OECD countries is significantly higher than the average index in CESEE countries.
However, there is a relatively large heterogeneity among OECD countries as well.
The final part of the paper used econometric models for studying the impact of fiscal and monetary institutions on macroeconomic stability and fiscal outcomes. Some evidence was found that better monetary institutions dampen macroeconomic volatility. But the hypothesis that better fiscal institutions promote macroeconomic stability could not be confirmed. This result can possibly be explained by the fact that various parameters which are important for macroeconomic stability have only weak impact on the index values.
Moreover, the index is specifically tailored to the CESEE region and therefore omits some important characteristics which are frequent in advanced countries but do not exist in CESEE countries. When controlling for the difference between interest rate and growth rate and initial level of debt, the Budgetary Discipline Index significantly explains debt and balance developments in CESEE countries: countries with a higher index had a smaller increase in the debt/GDP ratio and better budget balances. This result was robust to the inclusion of several control variables, including an indicator of overall institutional quality.
All of these results call for better budgetary procedures and improved monetary frameworks.
